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NOTES
MUSICK, PEELER & GARRETT v. EMPLOYERS
INSURANCE: WILL THE JUDICIAL OAK
SEED A JUDICIAL FOREST?
The United States Constitution vests the power to make laws in the
legislative branch1 and the power to interpret laws in the judicial branch.2
The judiciary nevertheless undertakes law-making functions when it cre-
ates federal common law.3 This sparks concerns that the judiciary is as-
1. Article I of the Constitution provides: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
2. Article III of the Constitution provides: "The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
3. Federal common law may be defined as "any federal rule of decision that is not
mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text." Thomas W. Merrill, The Com-
mon Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985); see also Martha A.
Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 890
(1986) (defining federal common law as "any rule of federal law created by a court...
when the substance of the rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments-constitutional
or congressional" (footnote omitted)). In essence, federal common law is a "label pinned
on a rule of law created by a federal court when it finds that an issue cannot be resolved
directly by reference to the Constitution, a treaty, a federal statute or state law." Ge-
orgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on the Subject, or a New Role
for Federal Common Law?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 167, 189 (1985).
The scope of federal common law is, however, an issue of debate among commentators.
For a narrower definition of federal common law, see Martin H. Redish, Federal Common
Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83
Nw. U. L. REV. 761 (1989). For a liberal definition of federal common law, see Field,
supra, at 883; Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805 (1989);
Jeanne Proko-Elkins, Comment, The Propriety of the Federal Common Law, 32 VILL. L.
REV. 1127 (1987).
Federal common law is different from state common law and the "general" common law
developed by the federal courts under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding
that federal courts were empowered to create uniformity in the law through the develop-
ment of a federal general common law), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). The federal general common law of Swift was the creation of state law by the
federal courts. In Erie Railroad, the Supreme Court, in overruling Swift, announced that
"Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable to the
states." Erie Railraod, 304 U.S. at 78. This holding confirmed the federal courts' ability to
determine federal common law for federal matters. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 60, at 387-88 (4th ed. 1983).
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suming the law-making authority of the legislative branch,4 since the
judiciary's power to create federal common law is not expressly granted
by the Constitution5 or any federal statute.6 Despite the lack of express
authority, the Supreme Court recognizes the need for, and authority of,
the judiciary to formulate federal common law in limited circumstances.7
Judicial creation of implied private rights of action8 is a significant as-
pect of this federal common law jurisprudence. 9 Prior to 1975,1° federal
4. The framers of the Constitution provided for the separation of powers within the
federal government to guard against judicial usurpation of the lawmaking function. Mer-
rill, supra note 3, at 19. Nevertheless, the creation of federal common law is recognized as
a legitimate function of the judiciary so long as this authority is exercised within certain
boundaries. See generally Proko-Elkins, supra note 3, at 1130-36 (discussing sources recog-
nized as legitimate authority for the creation of federal common law).
5. See Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Pre-
emption, 67 COLUm. L. REV. 1024, 1025-26 (1967) (explaining that the "place of such
judge-made law in our federal system is not immediately indicated by the Constitution").
6. Id.; Field, supra note 3, at 928.
7. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (indicating that
federal courts have limited powers to create federal common law where the sovereignty of
the United States, interstate controversies, or international controversies are at issue).
Federal courts are authorized to create federal common law in two instances: (1) when a
federal rule of decision is necessary to protect a uniquely federal interest; and (2) when
congressional legislation gives the judiciary the power to develop substantive law. North-
west Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 90 (1981). Federal courts have
created federal common law for purposes of rounding out incomplete legislation, establish-
ing uniform national application of a federal action, resolving conflicts between state and
federal laws where application of state law would frustrate federal policies, and where
federal interests are of the utmost importance. See Proko-Elkins, supra note 3, at 1136-51;
see also Merrill, supra note 3, at 35 (explaining that the Supreme Court recognizes its
authority to create federal common law when it fills gaps in, or supplements, a federal
statute).
8. An implied cause of action exists not by the express direction of Congress, but
rather by judicial recognition of its authority to enforce legal rights and duties. John
Haried, Comment, Implied Causes of Action: A Product of Statutory Construction or the
Federal Common Law Power?, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 356 (1980); see also infra note 52
(discussing causes of action and remedies).
9. See generally Haried, supra note 8 (analyzing the Supreme Court's federal com-
mon law jurisprudence as applied to implied causes of action). See Hill, supra note 5, at
1026-28 (explaining that federal common law arises when the judiciary creates substantive
duties through statutory or constitutional construction of the language, fashions remedies,
and preempts state laws).
One commentator notes that it appears the Supreme Court attempted to draw a clear
distinction between creating an implied right of action and interpreting federal common
law. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 4. This commentator suggests that the distinction rests
upon the analysis adopted by the Court; namely, that an implied right of action must be
found by interpreting the text to discern congressional intent, whereas the creation of fed-
eral common law need not be found in such a manner. Id.
10. In 1975, the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), set forth a rigid
four-part analysis to determine whether an implied right of action exists in a particular
statute. Id. at 78; see infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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courts freely created implied rights of action, while professing to do so
only when Congress-either expressly or by implication-intended their
creation.11 In the last decade and a half, however, the Supreme Court has
retreated from its willingness to establish implied private rights of ac-
tion. 2 During this period, some members of the Court questioned
whether the judiciary should create such substantive rights.' 3 This trend
spawned predictions that the implied rights doctrine would wither and
die."
Despite this restrictive trend, implied rights of action continue to play
an important role in the reliance on and use of federal securities laws.' 5
The most prominent influence is the judiciary's creation of a federal com-
mon law implied right of action to redress violations of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,16 which prohibits "deceptive and
11. Commentators note that the eleven-year period prior to Cort was the "expansion
era," 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS B. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODI-
TIES FRAUD § 2.2, at 462 (1992), and the "ebullient stage," Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1058 (1983), of the implied rights doctrine. See also William
F. Schneider, Implying Private Rights and Remedies Under the Federal Securities Acts, 62
N.C. L. REV. 853, 902 (1984); infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (discussing the
development and limitation of the Borak implied rights theory).
12. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979)
(finding that the appropriate standard for implying causes of action is to determine con-
gressional intent); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (holding that
the Court will only find implied causes of action based on congressional intent); infra notes
59-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's restrictive approach to its implied
rights jurisprudence).
13. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (ar-
guing that the judiciary "should get out of the business of implied private rights of action
altogether"); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 732 (1979) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (asserting that the judiciary assumes the law-making authority of the legislative branch
when it implies private rights of action).
14. This suggestion frequently arises in securities litigation. See 3B HAROLD S. BLOO-
MENTHAL, SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 9:03, at 9-30 (Supp. 1992) (discuss-
ing the Court's dislike for the implied rights doctrine); MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, SECURITIES
LITIGATION: DAMAGES § 5:03, at 21 (1992 Cumulative Supp.) (suggesting that if Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, along with Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Ken-
nedy, have an opportunity to address the private right of action under section 10(b), they
would most likely decide against its existence).
15. See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 89-94 (1981) (discussing the application of the
implied rights doctrine to aiding and abetting under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act); John H.
Langmore & Robert A. Prentice, Contribution Under Section 12 of the Securities Act of
1933: The Existence and Merits of Such a Right, 40 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1031-33 (1991) (dis-
cussing the application of the implied rights doctrine to section 12 of the 1933 Act); Schnei-
der, supra note 11, at 855 (discussing the powers of the judiciary to create remedies and
rights of actions).
16. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 78a-zzz (1988)) [hereinafter 1934 Act]. The Securities Act of 1933
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manipulative"' 7 securities practices. 8 In Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. ,9 the Supreme Court recognized an implied
right of action against those who commit securities fraud prohibited by
section 10(b)2° and by rule 10b-52 thereunder. Following the recognition
of this federal common law implied right of action, federal courts devel-
oped the contours of section 10(b) actions in a series of decisions.22 The
implied right of action under section 10(b) quickly grew from a "legisla-
tive acorn" into a "mighty oak.",
23
One branch of this oak, the right under section 10(b) to obtain contri-
bution from a joint tortfeasor, was consistently recognized by federal dis-
trict courts and federal courts of appeals for nearly twenty-five years.24
This principle received scant analysis for a number of years and was as-
sumed to be embedded in the jurisprudence of section 10(b).25 In 1981,
however, the Supreme Court, in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union26 and Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. ,27 nar-
rowly construed the power of federal courts to create a cause of action for
contribution.2 8 In these decisions, which did not involve interpretation of
regulates the initial offer and sale of securities. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title I, § 1, 48
Stat. 74 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-ll1 (1988)) [hereinafter 1933 Act].
17. See infra note 75 (providing the text of section 10(b)).
18. See Hill, supra note 5, at 1026; Merrill, supra note 3, at 45 n.198.
19. 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); see infra note 75 (providing the text of section 10(b)).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). See infra note 77 (providing the text of rule 10b-5). For
purposes of this Note, section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are collectively referred to as section
10(b).
22. See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
23. Justice Rehnquist stated: "When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we
deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
24. See infra notes 106, 132-33 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit has recog-
nized the existence of the right of contribution from a joint tortfeasor under section 10(b)
at least since 1982. Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 578 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 838 (1982); see also Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 559 (5th
Cir. 1981) (recognizing an implied right of contribution under section 10(b)), affd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
right to contribution under section 10(b) exists and finding apportionment of contribution
the more difficult issue); Sirota, 673 F.2d at 578 (concluding summarily that the right to
contribution exists under section 10(b)).
26. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
27. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
28. In Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, the Court stated that in order to find a
right of action, it must engage in the task of statutory construction. Northwest Airlines, 451
U.S. at 91; Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 639. These decisions refused to imply a right to
contribution under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act, and section 1 of
the Sherman Act. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 94 (finding that Congress did not ex-
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the securities laws, the Supreme Court held that neither public policy nor
equity justified creating a federal common law right of contribution under
a federal statute where Congress did not clearly intend to create one.29
After Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, several lower federal
courts split with the weight of lower court authority and refused to find
an implied right of contribution under section 10(b).3° In Chutich v.
Touche Ross & Co. ,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit relied upon the Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries analytical
framework in declining to recognize a federal common law implied right
of contribution under section 10(b).3 2 The Supreme Court granted certi-
orari in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance33 to resolve the
conflict between Chutich and the contrary conclusion reached by the
other circuits.34
In Musick, Peeler, the shareholders of Cousins Home Furnishings, Inc.
filed a class action against the parties involved in a public offering issued
in 1983; however, the plaintiffs did not sue the attorneys and accountants
who assisted in the offering. 35 Rather, upon settling the case, the defend-
ants' insurers, Employers Insurance of Wausau and Federal Insurance
Co., sued the attorneys and accountants alleging violations of section
10(b) and requesting contribution for a portion of the amount settled.
36
pressly or by implication intend to create a right of contribution for wage differentials that
violated the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); Texas Industries, 451
U.S. at 640 (finding that Congress did not expressly or by implication intend to create a
right to contribution among antitrust wrongdoers under section 1 of the Sherman Act).
See infra part II.A (discussing the Court's implied right of contribution jurisprudence).
29. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 638; Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 89-90, 98 n.41.
30. See, e.g., Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding
that Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries prevented the finding of an implied right to
contribution under section 10(b)); King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1280 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989)
(questioning whether Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries would preclude a finding of
contribution generally); In re Professional Fin. Management, Ltd., 683 F. Supp. 1283, 1286-
87 (D. Minn. 1988) (declining to find an implied right to contribution under section 10(b)
based upon Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries).
31. 960 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1992).
32. Id. at 722-24.
33. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
34. Id. at 2087. Compare Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575,
577 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding an implied right of contribution under section 10(b)), affd, 113
S. Ct. 2085 (1993) and In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1991) (same)
and Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 578 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 838 (1982) and Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 557-59 (5th Cir.
1981) (same), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) and
Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1979) (same) with Chutich, 960 F.2d at
724 (finding no implied right of contribution under section 10(b)).
35. Musick, Peeler, 954 F.2d at 576.
36. Id. at 577.
19941
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of California
dismissed the action.37 The district court held that the settling defendant
insurance companies were not entitled to contribution because they paid
no more than their fair share of the total liability.38 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,3 9 finding that federal
courts have long recognized an implied right of contribution under sec-
tion 10(b).4" The Ninth Circuit further found that, under federal law, a
party may seek contribution from a party not named in the original action
through a separate third-party action.41
The Supreme Court held in Musick, Peeler that an implied right of con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors exists under section 10(b).4 2 The
Supreme Court's analysis first focused on the threshold question of
whether the judiciary has the authority to find an implied contribution
right under section 10(b).4 3 The Court concluded that the parameters of
private actions under section 10(b) have become a matter of federal com-
mon law-an area which Congress left to the judiciary to fashion appro-
priate relief." Although the majority was careful not to find that the
judiciary had the authority to recognize an independent cause of action
not expressly created by statute, the Court skirted this issue by conclud-
ing that contribution was merely a remedy for an existing cause of ac-
tion.45 The Court stated that the proper test for determining whether to
create such a right turns on how the Congress that adopted section 10(b)
in 1934 (the 1934 Congress) would have addressed the right of contribu-
tion issue had the underlying section 10(b) private right of action been an
express provision of the 1934 Act.46 Using this standard, the Court found
an implied right of contribution under section 10(b) based on sections 9
and 18 of the 1934 Act, which expressly provide for contribution in simi-
37. Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,208 (S.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd, 954 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1992), affd, 113 S. Ct.
2085 (1993).
38. Id. at 95,855.
39. Musick, Peeler, 954 F.2d at 577.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2092 (1993). The
Supreme Court failed to provide guidance as to which method of apportioning liability
among joint tortfeasors is appropriate. For a complete discussion of this unresolved issue,
see Barbara Moses & Ronit Setton, Contribution Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Sec. & Comm. Reg.
(McGraw-Hill) 159 (Sept. 29, 1993).
43. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2086.
44. Id. at 2087-88.
45. Id. at 2088.
46. Id. at 2089-90.
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lar circumstances.47
The dissent agreed with the majority that discerning the 1934 congres-
sional intent was key to determining whether to imply a right of contribu-
tion under section 10(b).48 The dissent based its analysis, however, upon
the premise that the right of contribution is a separate cause of action,
not merely a remedy. 9 Thus, the dissent framed the issue as whether the
Court should imply a cause of action for contribution. 0 The dissent ex-
amined the language of section 10(b) and concluded that section 10(b)
does not recognize a private cause of action for contribution.'
This Note explores the role of the judiciary in the formulation of fed-
eral common law private rights of action and remedies. This Note first
examines the Supreme Court's development of its implied rights jurispru-
dence, including the section 10(b) implied right of action, and explores
whether contribution is a remedy or a separate cause of action under the
Court's implied rights jurisprudence. Next, this Note analyzes the major-
ity and dissenting opinions in Musick, Peeler and the potential impact of
the case on other areas of federal common law and implied rights juris-
prudence. It argues that the analysis set forth by the majority of the
Court sets a dangerous precedent. This Note concludes that the section
10(b) judicial oak, if left unchecked, could seed a judicial forest by con-
verting other causes of action into remedies not subject to the Court's
recent implied rights jurisprudence.
I. FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF THE IMPLIED RIGHTS DOCTRINE AND
ITS APPLICATION TO SECTION 10(b) OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
A. Evolution of the Implied Rights Doctrine
The existence of an implied private right of action originally was predi-
cated on the tort law maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium-where there is a right
there is a remedy.52 The seminal United States Supreme Court case con-
cerning implied rights of action is the 1916 Texas & Pacific Railway v.
47. Id. at 2090-91.
48. Id. at 2092 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 2093.
50. Id. at 2094.
51. Id. at 2094-95.
52. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. Remedies center on corresponding
rights and duties. A cause of action exists when a plaintiff has the right to sue for a remedy
resulting from another party's violation of a duty. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch.,
112 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1992); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 238 (1979). A remedy may be
available only after a duty has been created and a cause of action exists. Franklin, 112 S.
Ct. at 1033. Rights and duties are generally created by the Constitution or by Congress
through a statutory scheme. Id. "[If a right of action exists to enforce a federal right and
1994]
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Rigsby5 3 decision. Rigsby gave subsequent federal courts the latitude to
infer private statutory causes of action on behalf of special classes of
plaintiffs when faced with congressional silence. 4 The Court reaffirmed
and expanded this power in its 1964 J. Case Co. v. Borak decision.55 In
Borak, the Court supplied a cause of action it believed Congress would
have enacted if Congress had considered the issue.56 The Court held that
where a statute does not explicitly grant a cause of action, federal courts
have a duty to imply one whenever necessary to effectuate that statute's
congressional purpose. 7 The decade following Borak is termed the
"'hey-day of the implied rights doctrine,"' due to the establishment of an
unprecedented number of implied rights of action. 8
A little more than a decade later, the Supreme Court once again ad-
dressed the jurisprudence of the implied rights doctrine in Cort v. Ash.59
This decision rejected the Borak standard and severely limited federal
court authority to create implied causes of action.6" In Cort, the Court
developed a restrictive four-part analysis to determine whether Congress
impliedly created a cause of action in a particular statute.61 Supreme
Congress is silent on the question of remedies, a federal court may order any appropriate
relief." Id. at 1034.
53. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). In Rigsby, a railroad employee sought damages from his em-
ployer for injuries received on the job. Id. at 36-37. The employee argued that he should
be compensated because his employer was not in compliance with section 2 of the Federal
Safety Appliance Act. Id. at 37.
54. Id. at 39. The Rigsby Court held that where the "disregard of the command of the
statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in
default is implied." Id.; see also Steven L. Nelson, Note, Implication of Private Actions
From Federal Statutes: From Borak to Ash, 1 J. CORP. L. 371, 376 (1976) (discussing the
development of the tort-based approach to the implied rights doctrine).
55. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
56. Id. at 433-34. The Court held that the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act and the
exclusive grant of federal jurisdiction under section 27 of the 1934 Act, enabled it to imply
a cause of action for private parties who were injured by a violation of section 14(a) of the
1934 Act. Id. at 433.
57. Id.
58. Langmore & Prentice, supra note 15, at 1035 (quoting Robert A. Prentice, Implied
Rights of Action: Of Commodities and the Future, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 913
(1981)); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1969) (finding an
implied right of action under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Gomez v. Florida
State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 575-76 (5th Cir. 1969) (finding an implied right of
action under the Wagner-Peyser National Employment System Act); Goodman v. H.
Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (finding an implied right of action
under section 15(b)(5)(E) of the 1934 Act).
59. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
60. Id. at 85; see also Nelson, supra note 54, at 371-73 (examining the shift in the
Supreme Court's implied rights jurisprudence).
61. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. The four Cort factors to be analyzed are: (1) the language of
the statute itself; (2) its legislative history; (3) the underlying purpose and structure of the
[Vol. 43:987
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Court decisions following Cort strictly applied the four-part analysis. 62
This inquiry soon merged into the single question of whether Congress
intended such a right be created.63 The first factor, looking at the lan-
guage of the statute itself, necessarily provided little guidance, since the
statute always lacked an express cause of action. Thus, courts were left to
apply factors two through four, each of which seeks to discern congres-
sional intent.64 Congressional intent thus became the focal point for de-
termining whether a federal statute that did not expressly provide for a
cause of action should nevertheless be interpreted as inferring one.65
In 1979, the Supreme Court further abandoned the permissive Rigsby
doctrine in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington66 and Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis. 67 These decisions emphasized that the judi-
ciary may establish an implied right of action only when principles of
statutory construction evidence Congress' clear intent to create a private
right of action. 68 The Court restricted the search for congressional intent
to a showing that Congress neglected to include statutory language pro-
statutory scheme; and (4) the likelihood that Congress intended to supersede or to supple-
ment existing state remedies. Id.
62. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979)
(holding that the ultimate determination must be whether Congress intended to create a
cause of action); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (finding that
the Court's task is solely to determine what Congress intended); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (focusing the Cort analysis on congressional intent).
In all, the Supreme Court reversed seven federal courts of appeals' decisions that found
implied rights of action during the period between Cort and Transamerica Mortgage.
Transamerica Mortgage, 444 U.S. at 11; Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 560; Chrysler Corp.
v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977);
Cort, 422 U.S. at 66.
63. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91
(1981) (finding the central inquiry to be what Congress intended); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (same); Transamerica Mortgage, 444 U.S. at 15-16
(finding that the proper approach in discerning whether to imply private rights of action is
to determine congressional intent); Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 568, 575-76 (collapsing
the Cort factors into a single inquiry of congressional intent).
64. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (discussing the effectiveness of meth-
ods used by the Supreme Court to determine the elements of the section 10(b) cause of
action by examining congressional intent).
65. See Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 575; see also supra note 63.
66. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
67. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
68. Transamerica Mortgage, 444 U.S. at 24 (finding that the "dispositive question" is
congressional intent); Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 577 (stating that reliance on tort-
based principles to imply private rights of action is "misplaced").
The Court apparently adopted the position set forth in Justice Powell's dissent in Can-
non v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 731 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting), criticizing
the Cort four-part analysis. Justice Powell asserted that the Cort analysis allowed the judi-
ciary to assume policy-making authority of the legislative branch. Id. at 743. Justice Pow-
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viding for a cause of action through inadvertence.69 At the same time,
some members of the Court began to question whether it is ever proper
for the judiciary to create substantive rights.7"
These shifts in judicial philosophy produced a significant change in the
Court's rulings in implied rights cases. In at least eleven of the last fifteen
Supreme Court decisions addressing a request to recognize an implied
right of action decided before 1993, the Court found no such right.71 Still,
ell illustrated his argument by listing twenty courts of appeals' decisions between Cort and
Cannon that found implied private rights of action in federal statutes. Id. at 741-42.
69. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage, 444 U.S. at 20 (finding it unlikely that Congress
"absentmindedly forgot"' to provide a private right within the provision in question if the
private right was expressly written in other provisions of a statutory scheme (quoting Can-
non, 441 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting))).
70. Justice Scalia, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991),
stated that "the federal cause of action at issue here was never enacted by Congress and
hence the more narrow we make it (within the bounds of rationality) the more faithful we
are to our task." Id. at 2767 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). In Cannon, Justice
Powell stated that "[w]hen Congress chooses not to provide a private civil remedy, federal
courts should not assume the legislative role of creating such a remedy and thereby enlarge
their jurisdiction." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71. Since Transamerica Mortgage the Supreme Court has refused to recognize an im-
plied private right of action in the following cases: Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2749
(refusing to find an implied right of action for damages under section 14(a) of the 1933
Act); Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527 (1989) (refusing to find
an implied right of action under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978);
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (refusing to find an implied right of action
under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rus-
sell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (refusing to find an implied right of action under ERISA); Daily
Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984) (refusing to find an implied right of action
for investment companies under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940);
Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15 (1982)
(refusing to find an implied right of action under the Urban Mass Transportation Act);
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)
(refusing to find an implied right of action for damages under the federal Water Pollution
Control Act or the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972); Texas In-
dus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (refusing to find an implied right of
action for contribution under the Sherman Act); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287
(1981) (refusing to find an implied right of action under section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,
451 U.S. 77 (1981) (refusing to find an implied right of action for contribution under Title
VII); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (refusing to find an im-
plied right of action under the Davis-Bacon Act).
However, the Supreme Court did recognize an implied right of action in the following
cases: Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (recognizing an
implied right of action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Wright v. Roanoke
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987) (recognizing an implied right of action
under the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (plurality opinion) (recognizing an implied right of action
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (recognizing an implied right of action for damages under
the Commodities Exchange Act).
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the Court has been unwilling to overrule its prior decisions creating im-
plied rights of action.72  Instead, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg,3 the Court recognized its obligation to maintain and develop
the contours of such actions.74
B. Judicial Creation and Development of an Implied Right of Action
Under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits "deceptive" and "manipula-
tive" practices in the purchase and sale of securities.75 It does not contain
an express private right of action for violations;76 alternatively, Congress
provided for the promulgation of rules by the SEC under this statute.77
72. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1032 (1992) (ac-
cepting the establishment of the implied right of action created in Cannon and considering
what remedies are available pursuant to this implied right); Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct.
at 2763-64 (accepting the establishment of the implied right of action created in Borak and
considering the legitimacy of rounding out the contours of such an implied action).
73. 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
74. Id. at 2764. The Court stated that "where a legal structure of private statutory
rights has developed without clear indications of congressional intent, the contours of that
structure need not be frozen absolutely when the result would be demonstrably inequitable
to a class of would-be plaintiffs with claims comparable to those previously recognized."
Id.
75. Section 10 of the 1934 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
76. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975) (recog-
nizing that Congress did not consider private actions under section 10(b)).
There are two substantive references to section 10(b) in the legislative history of the
1934 Act. First, the Senate Report states that section 10(b) is "aimed at those manipulative
and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function." S.
REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 17, at 6 (J.S.
Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Second,
the House Hearings contained a statement by Thomas Corcoran, Counsel to the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, testifying on behalf of the drafters of section 10(b). He
noted that section 10(b) "is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices .... The
Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative devices." Stock Ex-
change Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 & H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Inter-
state & Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934), reprinted in 8 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra, item 23, at 115.
77. See supra note 75 for the text of section 10(b). The SEC enforces and administers
this provision. The SEC promulgated rule 10b-5 in 1942. The rule currently provides:
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When the SEC finally promulgated rule 10b-5 in 1942, however, it pro-
vided for no rights beyond those set forth in section 10(b). 78
The first case to recognize an implied private right of action under sec-
tion 10(b) was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., decided in 1946.79 In
Kardon, a federal district court found an implied action based upon the
common law principle that an injury requires a remedy. 0 Numerous fed-
eral district court and court of appeals decisions following Kardon al-
lowed private parties to bring implied rights of action for section 10(b)
violations.8 Twenty-five years after Kardon, the Supreme Court upheld
the existence of an implied private cause of action for violation of section
10(b) in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.82
The Court decided this case at a time when the liberal Borak theory of
federal court authority prevailed, thereby allowing implied causes of ac-
tion without serious inquiry into congressional intent.83
The Court issued a number of decisions after Bankers Life & Casualty
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
78. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 462-63 (1990).
79. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
80. Id. at 513. The court quoted Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916), for the proposition that "'[t]his is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi
remedium."' Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 513 (quoting Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39). Translated, this
phrase means, "Where there is a right, there is a remedy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1520 (6th ed. 1990); see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211
F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Speed v. Tansamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
82. 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). The Supreme Court later stated that it "simply explicitly
acquiesced in the 25-year-old acceptance by the lower federal courts of an implied action
under § 10(b)," rather than examine the existence of the implied private right of action
based on congressional intent. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 n.19
(1979); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (stating
that the Bankers Life & Casualty Co. Court confirmed the existence of an implied right of
action under section 10(b) "with virtually no discussion").
83. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Borak theory.
Rather than engage in extensive analysis, the Court acknowledged in a footnote that the
implied right of action under section 10(b) is now established. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. at 13 n.9.
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Co. defining the substantive and procedural scope of the section 10(b)
cause of action."4 These decisions established: (1) the class of persons
entitled to assert a claim under section 10(b);85 (2) the standard of con-
duct an investor must show to establish a claim;86 (3) the factors that
constitute a wrongful act;87 (4) the standard of proof for investors;88 (5)
the remedies available for a violation, and the appropriate measure of
damages;89 and (6) the applicable statute of limitations.90 The Court
crafted these elements of a section 10(b) action by analyzing what Con-
gress would have done if it had expressly created the cause of action.91
In order to ascertain congressional intent, the Court customarily begins
its analysis of section 10(b) by reviewing the statutory language of the
section.92 Because this approach provides little guidance in determining
the contours of a section 10(b) cause of action,93 the Court more often
84. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
85. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 736 (finding that persons entitled to bring an action
under section 10(b) are limited to purchasers and sellers-the intended beneficiaries of the
statute).
86. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976) (finding that liability under
section 10(b) is limited to violators who have scienter).
87. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (finding that a violation
of section 10(b) occurs only when there is a duty to disclose material nonpublic informa-
tion); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (finding that a failure to provide
advance notice of a merger was not a violation of section 10(b) where shareholders were
given all relevant information); Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. at 10 (finding that
section 10(b) governs the sale of securities to "'any person"' and that the transaction does
not have to occur on the stock exchange).
88. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390-91 (1983) (estab-
lishing the appropriate standard of proof as a preponderance of the evidence); Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (finding that scienter is a "mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud"); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
153-54 (1972) (finding that actual reliance on a material fact need not be shown to prove a
violation of section 10(b)).
89. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. at 13 (finding that an implied cause of
action under section 10(b) and any available state law remedies provide appropriate re-
dress for section 10(b) violations).
90. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2781
(1991) (providing for a statute of limitations similar to the one-and-three year limitations
imposed by other sections of the 1934 and 1933 Acts), superseded by statute as stated in
G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 783 F. Supp. 1532 (D.N.H. 1992). However, Lamp, Pleva
has since been effectively overruled by Congress. See infra note 102.
91. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985)
(recognizing that the intent of Congress governs the elements of an action under section
10(b)).
92. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (noting that every
inquiry into section 10(b) begins with an examination of the text of section 10(b)); Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197 (finding that an analysis of the section 10(b) cause of action should
begin with the language of section 10(b)).
93. In a few instances, however, this review has been fruitful. It provided some assist-
ance in developing the requirement that only purchasers and sellers have standing to bring
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has had to rely upon the legislative history and the policies underlying
section 10(b).94 Furthermore, the Court consistently determines the ele-
ments of the section 10(b) cause of action by comparing the language of
section 10(b) with other sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.95 Thus, in
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Court contrasted the lan-
guage of sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act with that of section 10(b),
concluding that an implied cause of action under section 10(b) must meet
the purchaser-seller requirement. 96 In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson,97 the Supreme Court discerned congressional in-
tent by comparing sections 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act to section 10(b), all
of which are similar in purpose, intent, and structure, in order to establish
a statute of limitations for section 10(b) actions.98
suit under section 10(b). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736
(1975) (finding that a cause of action under section 10(b) is limited to "purchasers or sell-
ers of securities"). It also aided in creating the requirement that a defendant must have
scienter to be liable under section 10(b). See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197, 201 (finding
that a violation under section 10(b) requires scienter because the words "manipulative,"
"device," and "contrivance" in section 10(b) indicate liability only for conduct different
from, and more severe, than negligence).
94. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226 (noting that section 10(b) was designed to be a
"catch-all" provision); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 & n.13 (1977) (relying
on legislative history to find that section 10(b) governs manipulative and deceptive con-
duct); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201-03 (finding that scienter is required for a section 10(b)
cause of action because of references in the legislative history that section 10(b) was en-
acted to prevent the use of "manipulative" and "cunning" devices); Blue Chip Stamps, 421
U.S. at 732-33 (discerning congressional intent from the defeat of proposed amendments to
section 10(b) in 1957 and 1959).
95. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,
2780 (1991) (finding no clearer indication of congressional intent can be found than that
contained in the other provisions of 1933 and 1934 Acts), superseded by statute as stated in
G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 783 F. Supp. 1532 (D.N.H. 1992); Santa Fe Industries, 430
U.S. at 476 (considering section 9 of the 1934 Act in interpreting section 10(b)); Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 204-08 (considering section 9 of the 1934 Act in interpreting section
10(b)).
96. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 752-54. The purchaser-seller element of section
10(b) refers to the restriction that only those shareholders who actually purchase or sell
securities may maintain a private cause of action against violators of section 10(b). Id. at
732-33. The Court noted that Congress "had little trouble" expressly providing a remedy
for those other than purchasers and sellers when Congress intended such protection. Id. at
734.
97. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991), superseded by statute as stated in G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch.
Dist., 783 F. Supp. 1532 (D.N.H. 1992).
98. Id. at 2780-81. The Court found that a private cause of action under section 10(b)
must be commenced within one year after discovery of facts constituting a violation and
within three years of such a violation because sections 9 and 18 provide the same time
limitations. Id. at 2780-81 nn.6-7. The Court adopted this rule to provide a uniform fed-
eral statute of limitations and to provide consistency with the provisions of the 1934 Act.
Id. at 2778-79. The Court set forth what appears to be a more limited test than previously
used in determining congressional intent-by considering what statute of limitations the
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Even though the Court has sought to determine the scope of a section
10(b) cause of action through the confines of congressional intent, some
Justices questioned the Court's broad authority to do so.99 The Court's
authority to interpret section 10(b) was expressly acknowledged by Con-
gress in two amendments to the 1934 Act, however, thereby legislatively
accepting the judicially created implied cause of action under section
10(b).' ° First, Congress enacted section 20A of the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. This amendment expressly
stated that nothing in the provision shall limit a party's implied right of
action under section 10(b).10 ' Second, in 1992 Congress expressly ac-
knowledged the judiciary's authority to shape the section 10(b) cause of
action by enacting section 27A of the 1934 Act, which limited the retroac-
tive effect of the statute of limitations standard adopted in Lampf
Pleva.102
1934 Congress would have applied to an express right of action under section 10(b) if it had
considered the issue. Id. at 2780.
99. The section 10(b) implied cause of action was thought to be somewhat established
after Congress adopted the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89
Stat. 97 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k-80b (1988)). These amendments are
considered the most comprehensive and extensive revisions to the 1934 Act since its enact-
ment. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 322. Since Congress left section 10(b) intact, it was thought that "Con-
gress ratified the cumulative nature of the § 10(b) action." Herman & MacLean v. Hud-
dleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 (1983).
Yet some Justices remained wary of the Court's role in fashioning implied rights of ac-
tions. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that the Court "should get out of the business of implied private rights of action
altogether"); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (espousing that "this Court in the future should be extremely reluctant to im-
ply a cause of action absent such specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch").
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (Supp. IV 1992); 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d) (1988).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d). Section (d) of the Act states: "Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit.., the availability of any cause of action implied from a provision of this
chapter." Id. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 was en-
acted as Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
Section 20A of this Act provides that investors may hold insider traders and their tippers
jointly and severally liable under section 10(b)'s implied right of action. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-
1(c).
The House Energy and Commerce Committee also recognized federal court authority to
shape implied rights of action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. See H.R. REP. No. 100-
910, 100th Cong. 2d Sess., 27, 39 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6064, 6076.
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (Supp. IV 1992). Subsection (a) of this provision, for exam-
ple, states: "The limitation period for any private civil action implied under [section 10(b)]
of this title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as
such laws existed on June 19, 1991." Id. § 78aa-1(a). Congress enacted section 27A of the
1934 Act, Pub. L. No. 102-242, title IV, § 476, 105 Stat. 2387 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1
(Supp. IV 1992)), to reinstate certain implied private actions brought under section 10(b)
that otherwise would have been barred by the section 10(b) statute of limitations estab-
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II. THE IMPLIED RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION
Though the Supreme Court developed most elements of the section
10(b) cause of action,0 3 the question remained whether there was an im-
plied right to contribution'" under section 10(b). 1°5 Most federal courts
recognized the right to contribution among tortfeasors under section
10(b) in the absence of Supreme Court guidance.' 6 In' 1981, however,
two leading Supreme Court decisions set forth an analysis for determin-
ing whether an implied right to contribution may be created by federal
courts.' 0 7 In both decisions the Court analyzed an implied right to contri-
bution as a private right of action rather than as a remedy, thus refusing
lished by the Supreme Court in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991), superseded by statute as stated in G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist.,
783 F. Supp. 1532 (D.N.H. 1992). For a discussion of the Court's decision in Lampf Pleva
see supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of a section
10(b) cause of action established by the Supreme Court).
104. A right to contribution is claimed by one tortfeasor against another tortfeasor
where both are liable to the same plaintiff for the same injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 886A (1979). Such claims are brought to compel the other tortfeasor to con-
tribute to the liability imposed on only one tortfeasor. See James S. O'Shaughnessy, Note,
Judicial Implication of Contribution Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: Is
The New Branch on the Judicial Oak Threatened by Strict Statutory Construction?, 16 SUF-
FOLK U. L. REV. 983, 983-85 (1982). The right to contribution is based upon the policy
notion that when two or more persons share responsibility for a wrong, it is inequitable to
require just one to bear the entire cost of liability. Id. Contribution also is premised upon
the view that such a right will deter wrongdoing because contribution reduces the likeli-
hood that any one tortfeasor will injure someone and expect another to bear the liability.
Id.
105. The Supreme Court expressly left unresolved whether an implied right of contribu-
tion existed under section 10(b). See Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
640 n.l (1981) (stating that the Court would not express any "view as to the correctness"
of decisions recognizing an implied right of contribution under section 10(b)); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91-92 n.24 (1981) (acknowledging
that a number of federal courts have recognized an implied right of action under section
10(b), but refusing to address the issue).
106. See supra note 34 (listing federal circuit courts that have recognized an implied
right of contribution under section 10(b)); see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Patriot's Point Dev. Auth., 772 F. Supp. 1565, 1569 (D.S.C. 1991) (recognizing an implied
right of contribution under section 10(b)); MFS Mun. Income Trust v. American Medical
Int'l, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 279, 281 (D. Mass. 1990) (same); Baker v. BP America, Inc., 749 F.
Supp. 840, 842-44 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (same); In re National Student Mktg. Litig., 517 F.
Supp. 1345, 1346-49 (D.D.C. 1981) (same); Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271, 1276
(E.D. La. 1979) (same); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1266-67 (D. Del. 1978)
(same), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill
& Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co.,
366 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (same).
107. See infra notes 110-30 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's im-
plied right of contribution jurisprudence).
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to create such a right.'l 8 The Supreme Court's analytical framework sub-
sequently led some federal courts to abandon precedent and find no right
of contribution under section 10(b). 10 9
A. The Supreme Court's Implied Right of Contribution Jurisprudence
In two 1981 decisions, the Supreme Court declined to imply a cause of
action for contribution under three federal statutes." 0 In Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,"' the Supreme Court rejected an
employer's claim that an implied right of contribution exists under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act or under the Equal Pay Act." 2 The Court
held that an implied cause of action for contribution may arise in two
ways. 1 3 First, Congress may create a cause of action, either expressly or
impliedly. 14 Second, the judiciary may create a cause of action for con-
tribution under federal common law to provide appropriate remedies for
unlawful conduct."
5
The Northwest Airlines Court examined whether Congress provided
for such a right in the statutes at issue. 1 6 It found that Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act do not expressly provide for a right of contribution."
7
Nor did the Court find anything in either Acts' statutory structure or leg-
islative history to support a right of contribution." 8 Moreover, the Court
108. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 94-95; Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 641-42.
109. Compare Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 578 (2d Cir.) (recognizing
an implied right to contribution under section 10(b)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838, and cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982) and Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1979)
(explaining that contribution is used to distribute losses equally and fairly) with Chutich v.
Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that federal courts cannot
imply a right of contribution because this discretion is properly reserved to the executive
and legislative branches). See also infra note 134.
110. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 77; Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 630.
111. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
112. Id. at 98.
113. Id. at 90.
114. Id. at 91. The Court explained that when a federal statute does not expressly pro-
vide for a particular right of action, that right may be created through statutory construc-
tion. Id.
115. Id. at 90 (finding that "a cause of action for contribution may have become a part
of the federal common law through the exercise of judicial power to fashion appropriate
remedies for unlawful conduct"); cf Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct.
1028, 1034 (1992) (distinguishing between whether there is a right to a cause of action and
whether there is a right to relief or a remedy). See generally supra note 52 (explaining the
analytical difference between remedies and causes of action).
116. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91-94.
117. Id. at 91.
118. Id. at 91-94. The Court applied the Cort analysis and examined the language of
the statute itself, other provisions within Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, and the legisla-
tive histories of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Id.
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determined that the right of contribution was a separate cause of action
and not a remedy under the statutory scheme. 1 9 The Court noted that
the employer, the tortfeasor, was outside the intended class of statutory
beneficiaries and was in fact in the class against whom the statute was
directed. 2 ° Thus, the Court held that there could be no right of contribu-
tion without the "essential predicate" of congressional intent to protect
such a person.'
2 '
The Court then analyzed whether federal common law could be fash-
ioned to create an implied right of contribution.' 22 The Court found that
where a statutory scheme is broad, detailed, and evidences congressional
consideration of appropriate causes of action, it is not necessary to create
additional causes of action. 123 Because Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
are broad and detailed, the Court concluded that federal common law
could not be used to create a right of contribution.
124
Similarly, in Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,125 the Court
found that an antitrust defendant had no express or implied right to con-
tribution from coconspirators under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 126 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the analytical framework set
forth in Northwest Airlines.27 The Court stated that federal courts have
the authority to craft federal common law-(1) when a federal court's
decision is "'necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,"' or (2) when
Congress confers the authority upon the judiciary to develop substantive
law.'12  The Court also held it improper to address policy considerations
119. Id. at 88-89. The Court explained that all elements of a contribution claim were
established in Northwest Airlines. Id.
120. Id. at 92.
121. Id. at 94. Although the Northwest Airlines Court abandoned the tort-based ap-
proach to implied rights and adopted a statutory construction approach, it maintained the
Court's restrictive trend, focusing its analysis on providing rights for those whom the stat-
ute was enacted to benefit. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text (discussing the
shift in the Court's implied rights jurisprudence).
122. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95-98.
123. Id. at 97.
124. Id. at 97-99.
125. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
126. Id. at 640.
127. Id. at 638; see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing the Northwest
Airlines analytical framework for determining an implied right of contribution).
128. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 640 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)). The Court explained that the areas in which the judiciary has
substantive law-making power are limited. Id. at 641. In the Court's opinion, without
"congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common
law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of
the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of
States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases." Id. (footnotes omitted).
The Court specifically discussed its role in creating federal common law in the areas of
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when deciding whether to create federal common law, because policy
questions are only to be considered by Congress.129 After examining the
legislative history and discerning for whose benefit the statute was en-
acted, the Court found that Congress neither expressly nor impliedly in-
tended to create an implied cause of action for contribution under section
1 of the Sherman Act. 3°
B. Contribution Under Section 10(b)
Prior to Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, the federal courts of
appeals and district courts generally agreed that principles of federal
common law and policy considerations authorized the courts to create an
implied right of contribution under section 10(b). 3 The first case to rec-
ognize such an implied cause of action for contribution was deHaas v.
Empire Petroleum Co.,132 decided in 1968. After deHaas, four federal
courts of appeals recognized an implied cause of action for contribution
under section 10(b).' 33 Following the Court's refusal in Texas Industries
and Northwest Airlines to find such a right in Title VII, the Equal Pay
Act, and the Sherman Act, however, some federal courts of appeals and
district courts began to reconsider whether an implied cause of action for
contribution was available under section 10(b).
134
admiralty, labor-management relations, and monopolies and restraints on trade. Id. at
642-45; see supra notes 3-7 (discussing the limited law-making power of the judiciary).
129. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 646-47.
130. Id. at 648.
131. See, e.g., Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding an implied
right of contribution under section 10(b)); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d
534, 559 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding a right of contribution under section 10(b)), affd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330,
334 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding a right of contribution under section 10(b)); Globus, Inc. v.
Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (finding a right of contri-
bution under section 10(b)), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
941 (1971).
132. 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), affd in part and vacated in part, 435 F.2d 1223
(10th Cir. 1970).
133. See supra note 131.
134. See, e.g., King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1280 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989) (explaining that an
earlier decision finding an implied right of contribution under section 10(b) improperly
analyzed the right of contribution in light of Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines);
Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1105-06 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding
no implied right of contribution or indemnification under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act
based on the Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines analytical framework and on the
irrelevancy of policy considerations in the absence of congressional intent to create such a
cause of action); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 119 n.17 (2d Cir. 1981) (questioning why
defendants did not argue that the court exceeded its authority to apportion liability among
defendants in a section 10(b) cause of action in light of Texas Industries and Northwest
Airlines), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982); Biden v. Card, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,512, at 92,331-32 n.2 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (discussing the trend to
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In response to Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Chutich v. Touche Ross
& Co.,135 held that federal courts have no power to create a right of ac-
tion for contribution among violators of section 10(b).136 The Eighth Cir-
cuit adopted the standard set forth in Texas Industries and Northwest
Airlines, and applied it to determine whether an implied right of contri-
bution exists under section 10(b).1 37 The Eighth Circuit refused to find a
right to contribution under section 10(b) because such a right does not
implicate "uniquely federal interests," and because no provision in the
1934 Act gives the judiciary broad power to develop a federal common
law of implied contribution. 13  While the Eighth Circuit found that the
judiciary has more authority to provide a remedy than to create a cause
of action, it concluded that contribution is a separate cause of action.
139
The court explained that the power to create a new cause of action for
disallow an implied right of contribution under section 10(b) in light of Texas Industries
and Northwest Airlines); Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp., 730 F. Supp. 122, 124-25
(N.D. Iil. 1989) (finding no implied right of contribution under section 10(b) based upon
application of the Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines analytical framework); Nelson v.
Craig-Hallum, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,500, at 93,192-93
(D. Minn. 1989) (finding no implied right of contribution under section 10(b) in light of
Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines); In re Professional Fin. Management, Ltd., 683 F.
Supp. 1283, 1285-87 (D. Minn. 1988) (finding no implied right of contribution under sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act or section 12(2) of the 1933 Act based upon application of the
analytical framework set forth in Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines).
135. 960 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1992).
136. Id. at 722. Other federal courts of appeals read Northwest Airlines and Texas In-
dustries as limiting the authority of the judiciary to create an implied cause of action for
contribution in other areas of law. See, e.g., Mortgages, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 934
F.2d 209, 213 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing to create an implied right of contribution under the
False Claims Act); United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 92 n.6 (1st Cir.
1990) (refusing to create an implied right of contribution under CERCLA); Kim v.
Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to create an implied right of
contribution under ERISA); Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1191 (7th
Cir. 1989) (refusing to create an implied right of contribution under I.R.C. § 6672(a));
Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 862 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1988) (refusing to
create an implied right of contribution under the Lanham Act), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006
(1989).
137. Chutich, 960 F.2d at 722; see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing
the Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines analytical framework for determining an im-
plied right of contribution).
138. Chutich, 960 F.2d at 724; see supra note 7 (discussing the authority of federal
courts to created federal common law).
139. Chutich, 960 F.2d at 724. The Eighth Circuit directly relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
The Court in Franklin recognized that Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries "involved
holdings that plaintiffs had no right of action," rather than no right to a remedy. Franklin,
112 S. Ct. at 1034 n.6; see supra note 52 (explaining that remedies analytically differ from
causes of action).
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contribution is beyond its jurisdiction and properly falls within the power
reserved for the legislative and executive branches.' 40 The court, there-
fore, found that federal courts do not have authority to fashion a right of
action for contribution among violators of section 10(b).'41
III. MUSICK, PEELER & GARRETT V. EMPLOYERS INSURANCE:
JUDICIAL IMPLICATION OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v.
Employers Insurance142 to resolve the conflict between Chutich and the
contrary conclusion reached by other circuits.' 43 In Musick, Peeler, the
shareholders of Cousins Home Furnishings, Inc. filed a class action
against Cousins, its holding company, and certain officers and direc-
tors.' 44 The shareholders alleged that the defendants violated federal se-
curities laws and California corporation laws in connection with a 1983
public offering issued by Cousins.' 45 The shareholders also sued two of
the lead underwriters, but did not sue the attorneys or accountants in-
volved in the public offering. 146 The parties eventually settled the suit for
$13.5 million.147 The defendants expressly denied liability.148 The de-
fendants' insurers, Employers Insurance of Wausau and Federal Insur-
ance Co., then sued the attorneys and accountants, alleging violation of
section 10(b) and requesting contribution for a portion of the settlement
amount. 49
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California
dismissed the action. 5 ° The district court held that a settling defendant is
not entitled to contribution where it has paid no more than its fair share
of the total liability. 5 ' The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed,' 52 finding that federal courts long have recognized that
section 10(b) implies a right of contribution even though no explicit right
140. Chutich, 960 F.2d at 724.
141. Id.
142. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
143. Id. at 2087; see supra note 34 (setting out the conflicting circuits).
144. Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 576 (9th Cir. 1992),




148. Id. at 577.
149. Id.
150. Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,208 (S.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd, 954 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1992), affd, 113 S. Ct.
2085 (1993).
151. Id. at 95,855.
152. Musick, Peeler, 954 F.2d at 577.
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is set forth in the statute." 3 The court further found that under federal
law, a party may seek contribution from an unnamed party in the original
action through a third-party action."5 4 After the Ninth Circuit decided
Musick, Peeler, the Eighth Circuit handed down the Chutich decision,
creating a conflict among the circuits. 55 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in Musick, Peeler to resolve the conflict.
A. The Majority: Devising Distinctions
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority," 6 addressed the issue of
whether defendants in a suit based on an implied private right of action
under section 10(b) may seek contribution from joint tortfeasors.'5 7 The
Court held that there is such a right as a matter of federal law.
158
The Court acknowledged its earlier refusal to recognize an implied
right of contribution under various federal laws in Northwest Airlines and
in Texas Industries.59 The Court concluded, however, that the Northwest
Airlines and Texas Industries decisions were not relevant to its inquiry
into whether an implied right of contribution exists under section
10(b). 6 ° The Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries decisions were dis-
tinguishable because the federal statutes being interpreted provided an
express cause of action against violators of those provisions.6 In con-
trast, the section 10(b) cause of action was never enacted by Congress,
rather it was implied by the judiciary.' 62 The Court therefore found that
the analytical framework used in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries
153. Id.
154. Id. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the right of contribution is a substantive
right and is a separate cause of action from the underlying litigation. Id.
155. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text (discussing the Chutich decision).
156. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, Scalia, and Souter joined with
Justice Kennedy in the majority decision. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113
S. Ct. 2085, 2086 (1993).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2087. The Supreme Court also recognized that it previously found an im-
plied right of contribution among joint tortfeasors in federal common law admiralty deci-
sions. Id. The Court declined to rely upon these admiralty decisions, however, reasoning
that admiralty is an area in which the federal judiciary historically has been responsible for
the elaboration of legal doctrines and the creation of just and equitable remedies. Id.; see
supra part II.A (discussing the Supreme Court's Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines
decisions).
160. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2087.
161. Id. at 2087-88.
162. Id. at 2088. The Court explained that the Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries
analytical framework provides no guidance in cases where the underlying right of action
was originally premised on the implied rights theory that "courts should recognize private
remedies to supplement federal statutory duties." Id. The Court appears to accept the
continued existence and vitality of private rights of action created under the Borak stan-
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was not the proper method to determine whether to create a right of
contribution for a right that was itself implied.'63
The Court rejected Musick, Peeler's argument that the creation of a
new right of contribution should be left to Congress, not the judiciary."6
The Court held that where conduct is already subject to liability through
an implied right of action, the Court has the authority to treat newly cre-
ated duties such as contribution as ancillary questions. 165 The Court also
found that a right of contribution is merely a remedy, not a separate im-
plied private right of action under section 10(b).166 It reasoned that con-
tribution, by definition, is sought against persons who have allegedly
violated existing securities laws.1 67 The Court believed it unfair to sustain
an implied right of action under section 10(b) while declining to fashion a
way for one tortfeasor to obtain just contribution from another
tortfeasors.
168
The Court justified its broad authority to shape the parameters of the
section 10(b) cause of action by concluding that Congress knowingly ab-
dicated to the judiciary the authority to shape the section 10(b) cause of
action. 1 69 The Court identified goals to be considered in determining
dard, under which federal courts have a duty and, in effect, the inherit authority to create a
remedy where none existed. See supra notes 55-58 (discussing the Borak standard).
163. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2088; see infra note 165.
164. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2088.
165. Id. The Court found that the analytical framework set forth in Northwest Airlines
and Texas Industries was not controlling. Id. The Court determined that the Northwest
Airlines and Texas Industries analytical framework would apply only when federal courts
seek to create a duty for: (1) conduct already subject to liability under an express cause of
action, or (2) conduct not already subject to liability through a particular statute. Id. It is
unclear from the Court's analysis if its standard for creating new duties under implied
causes of action is applicable only when creating a duty for contribution, or if the standard
may be applied more broadly.
166. Id.; see supra note 52 (explaining that remedies analytically differ from causes of
action).
167. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2088. The Court explained that the duty it sought to
recognize by creating a right to contribution arises from a wrong that is already subject to
liability through an implied right of action. Id.
168. Id. The Court stated that "[hiaving implied the underlying liability in the first
place, to now disavow any authority to allocate it on the theory that Congress has not
addressed the issue would be most unfair to those against whom damages are assessed."
Id.
169. Id. The Court derived authority to fashion the section 10(b) cause of action from
recent congressional amendments to the 1934 Act, which expressly acknowledged the
Supreme Court's primary role in this area. Id. at 2089; see supra notes 99-102 and accom-
panying text (discussing congressional abdication of maintaining and defining the section
10(b) cause of action). The Court also emphasized that federal courts long have assumed
primary responsibility for defining "the scope of the 10b-5 right and the definition of the
duties it imposes." Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2089. The Court noted that the judiciary's
role was necessary because of the absence of congressional guidance. Id. (citing Virginia
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whether to create an implied right of contribution under section 10(b).1 70
Establishment of such parameters was based on achieving three goals: (1)
to prevent a conflict between judge-made action and Congress' express
right of action; (2) to promote clarity, consistency, and coherence of sec-
tion 10(b) jurisprudence; and (3) to achieve congressional objectives for
securities laws.
17 1
In this case, the Court found concerns with efficiency and equity to be
irrelevant, noting that it declined to consider such issues in Northwest
Airlines and Texas Industries.1 72 Rather, Justice Kennedy declared that
the Court's task is to ascertain how the 1934 Congress would have de-
cided the right to contribution issue if section 10(b) had originally con-
tained an express private right of action. 173 The purpose of this analysis,
Justice Kennedy reasoned, is to provide symmetrical and consistent rules
governing the section 10(b) action in conjunction with the overall struc-
ture of the 1934 Act and those provisions of the Act most like the section
10(b) implied right of action.
174
The Court found useful guidance in its search for congressional intent
in sections 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act. 175 The Court determined that sec-
tions 9 and 18 are the most analogous in purpose, intent, and structure to
section 10(b). 1 76 The Court found that sections 9, 18, along with section
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 (1991)); see supra notes 71-74 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's burden of maintaining implied causes of action).
170. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2090.
171. Id. The Court stated that its goals for establishing limits for the section 10(b)
cause of action have not changed over time, even though the Court's discretion has been
limited. Id.
172. Id. at 2089; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
173. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2089-90.
174. Id. at 2090; see supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
analytical approach to determining the elements of the section 10(b) cause of action).
175. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2090-91. Section 9 of the 1934 Act prohibits the willful
manipulation of security prices. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1988). Section 18 of the 1934 Act prohib-
its misleading filings. 15 U.S.C. § 78r.
The Court noted that an inquiry into whether Congress might have created a right of
contribution under section 10(b) is unconvincing and unpromising because Congress never
considered whether to create the underlying section 10(b) cause of action when it enacted
the 1934 Act. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2090. The Court determined, therefore, that
analysis of the language of section 10(b) provides little guidance for discerning Congress'
intent as to the scope of section 10(b). Id. The Court added that since the 1934 Congress
did not consider providing a private cause of action under section 10(b), it could not have
considered how to limit, compute, or allocate liability arising from such an action. Id.
176. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2090. The Court adopted a similar analysis in Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991), superseded by
statute as stated in G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 783 F. Supp. 1532 (D.N.H. 1989),
which provided a uniform statute of limitations for section 10(b) causes of action. See
supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Lampf, Pleva decision).
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10(b), to discourage fraudulent and manipulative securities practices, and
ensure full disclosure of material information.'77 The Court then noted
that sections 9 and 18 expressly provide for contribution.'78 The Court
also examined the six other provisions of the 1934 Act and 1933 Act' 17 9
that provide express causes of action but, unlike section 9 and 18, do not
provide express rights for contribution.8 0 Reasoning that section 10(b)
more closely resembles sections 9 and 18,' the Court adopted a contri-
bution rule under section 10(b). 82
The Court further noted that implying a right for contribution under
section 10(b) is consistent with the longstanding lower court practice of
recognizing an implied right of contribution under section 10(b).183 The
Court also noted that a right to contribution does not hinder or detract
from the effectiveness of the implied private right of action under section
177. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2090. The Court stated that the purpose of each sec-
tion is "'to deter fraud and manipulative practices in the securities market, and to ensure
full disclosure of information material to investment decisions."' Id. (quoting Randall v.
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1968)).
178. Id. at 2091. Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act provides for an express right of contribu-
tion: "Every person who becomes liable to make any payment under this subsection may
recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if joined in the original
suit, would have been liable to make the same payment." 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988).
Section 18(b) of the 1934 Act also provides for an express right of contribution: "Every
person who becomes liable to make payment under this section may recover contribution
as in cases of contract from any person who, if joined in the original suit, would have been
liable to make the same payment." 15 U.S.C. § 78r(b).
179. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2091. In addition to sections 9 and 18, the 1934 Act
contains three provisions that provide an express private right of action: (1) section 16, 15
U.S.C. § 78p (prohibiting the unfair use of information by directors, officers, and principal
stockholders); (2) section 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (governing the liability of controlling per-
sons); and (3) section 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (prohibiting the purchase or sale of securities
while possessing material, nonpublic information).
The 1933 Act also contains three provisions that provide an express private right of
action: (1) section 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (prohibiting untrue and misleading statements); (2)
section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (prohibiting false and misleading statements in connection with
the sale of a security); and (3) section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (providing for derivative
liability).
180. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2091.
181. Id. To support this determination, the Court asserted that all three sections (1)
impose direct liability on defendants for their own acts as opposed to derivative liability for
the acts of others, (2) involve defendants who violated the securities law with scienter, (3)
impose liability on multiple defendants acting in concert in many instances, and (4) were
enacted into law by the 73rd Congress. Id. at 2090-91.
182. Id. at 2091. The Court adopted this implied right to contribution as a matter of
consistency and dismissed any concern that such a rule would frustrate the purposes of
section 10(b). Id.
183. Id. at 2091; see supra notes 34 & 106 and accompanying text (setting out federal
courts of appeal and district courts decisions recognizing an implied right of contribution
under section 10(b)).
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10(b), or the operation of the securities laws.'8 4 Accordingly, the Court
declared that the contribution rule will stand, absent proof that it frus-
trates the section 10(b) cause of action or the 1934 Act as a whole. 85
B. The Dissent: Taking the Traditional Approach
Justice Thomas, joined in dissent by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor,
declared that the Court nourished the "'judicial oak"' by cultivating a
new branch of section 10(b) actions.18 6 The dissent accepted the Court's
defined task of ascertaining how the 1934 Congress would have decided
the right of contribution if section 10(b) originally contained an express
private right of action." 7 The dissent disagreed, however, with the
method of analysis by which the Court reached its conclusion.1
88
The dissent reasoned that the Court should not use different standards
for interpreting and applying rights of action based on whether their ori-
gin is express or implied." 9 The dissent concluded that a proper interpre-
tation and application of a right should be based on an inquiry into
statutory text, congressional intent, and legislative purpose. 90 Therefore,
the dissent reasoned, the Court should be constrained, absent any com-
pelling reason, from recognizing contribution under section 10(b) beyond
the scope intended by Congress.'
91
The dissent criticized the Court for abandoning its stated reluctance to
184. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2091. This statement contradicts the Court's an-
nounced standard of analysis for determining whether there is a right of contribution in
cases where the conduct is governed by law. See supra text accompanying note 172 (dis-
cussing the majority's position that efficiency and equity were irrelevant).
185. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2091-92.
186. Id. at 2092 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).
187. Id.
188. Id. Before turning to the contribution issue, the dissent noted that the language of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 scarcely suggest congressional intent for an implied cause of
action under section 10(b). Id. The dissent found no reason, however, to reconsider
whether an implied right of action under section 10(b) originally should have been recog-
nized. Id.
189. Id. at 2092-93. The majority distinguished between the conduct governed by ex-
press statutory language and that conduct governed under certain provisions. See supra
notes 159-63 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's decision to adopt a different
standard based on whether a cause of action is express or implied). The dissent suggests
that the Court examine congressional intent, statutory language, and legislative purpose as
its analytical starting point, no matter what the basis of the action. Musick, Peeler, 113 S.
Ct. at 2093. In doing so, the dissent rejects the Court's approach of using its authority in a
given area of law to decide whether an implied right of action exists.
190. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2093. Conversely, the majority only examined sec-
tions 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act in conjunction with the statutory text and legislative purpose
of section 10(b). See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
191. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2093.
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create implied rights of action.192 Characterizing the contribution right as
an element of liability under a section 10(b) action rather than as a sepa-
rate cause of action, enabled the majority to dodge its implied rights
precedents. 93 The dissent explained that the right of contribution is an
entirely separate cause of action and does not clarify the elements of a
section 10(b) action, unlike, for example, a statute of limitations. 194 Fur-
thermore, the dissent emphasized that adoption of an implied right of
contribution may provide a remedy contrary to state laws.' 95
The dissent redefined the issue before the Court as whether congres-
sional intent or federal common law gives the Court authority to expand
the class entitled to enforce section 10(b) through private actions, not
whether a contribution right is an ancillary issue to a section 10(b) ac-
tion.196 The dissent warned that inappropriate extension of section 10(b)
actions would weaken the careful design of the express rights Congress
provided in other sections of the 1934 Act. 197 Thus, the Court erred by
relying solely on sections 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act.' 98 The dissent de-
clared that the proper analysis comes from the Court's "well-established"
Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries analysis for determining whether
to imply a right of contribution.'99
Applying this analysis, the dissent concluded that there is no right of
contribution under section 10(b).2" The right of contribution under sec-
tion 10(b) depends solely upon a statutory interpretation of section
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.; see supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's establish-
ment of the elements of the section 10(b) cause of action and the methods it used).
195. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2093.
196. Id. Where courts seek to create a right of action, the Northwest Airlines and Texas
Industries analytical framework is applied to justify such authority. See supra part II.A
(discussing the Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines decisions). Under this analysis,
federal courts examine congressional intent through the application of the traditional Cort
factors. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional Cort fac-
tors and the application thereof).
197. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2093.
198. Id. 2093-94.
199. Id. at 2094. Under this analysis, the dissent found that federal courts may create a
right to contribution when concluding that Congress intended to create a private right of
action, either expressly or by implication, or as an exercise of their power under federal
common law. Id.; see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing the Texas
Industries and Northwest Airlines analytical framework).
200. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2094. The dissent agreed with the Court's conclusion
that the contribution right recognized in admiralty "has no bearing on the availability of
contribution under the elaborate federal statutory scheme governing purchases and sales
of securities." Id.; see supra note 159 (discussing the majority's explanation of prior admi-
ralty decisions). By reaching this conclusion, the dissent seemingly distinguished the
Court's power to fashion the federal common law of admiralty, readily recognized as
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10(b).2 10 Examining the language of section 10(b), its legislative history,
its underlying policies, and the structure of the 1934 Act, the dissent
found no indication of a contribution right.20 2 The dissent reasoned that
Congress did not intend to extend protection to a class of individuals who
violated the provision.20 3 Had Congress intended to provide a contribu-
tion right in section 10(b), it would have expressly done so, just as it had
in sections 9 and 18.204 Thus, the dissent concluded that Congress specifi-
cally chose not to provide such a right.2"5
The dissent also found that a right of contribution undermines the
Court's established policies governing section 10(b). 2° Previous Court
decisions limited the right to bring a section 10(b) action to actual pur-
chasers and sellers of securities.20 7 An action for contribution, the dissent
concluded, would be one level removed from the exchange of securities
because it would involve attorneys and accountants who merely advised
or facilitated the securities transaction that resulted in a violation of sec-
tion 10(b).20 8
In conclusion, the dissent reiterated that the issue facing the Court was
whether courts have the power to create a cause of action absent legisla-
tion.20 9 The dissent stated that courts should not treat congressional si-
lence as a license for action, 210 and concluded that section 10(b) does not
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and its power to fashion federal securities law,
governed by numerous, far-reaching statutes.
201. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2094.
202. Id. at 2094-95. The dissent found no language in either section 10(b) or rule 10b-5
suggesting that there should be a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. Id. at 2094.
The dissent explained that "[n]either enactment suggests that Congress or the SEC in-
tended to 'softe[n] the blow on joint wrongdoers' by permitting contribution." Id. at 2095
(quoting Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981)) (alteration in
original). Moreover, the underlying policies of the 1934 Act do not permit a section 10(b)
contribution action. Id.
203. Id.; see supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing the Rigsby decision grant-
ing an implied cause of action for special classes of plaintiffs).
204. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2095; see supra note 178 (quoting the text of sections 9
and 18).
205. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2095. The dissent emphasized that over the years
Congress had the ability to provide for such an action. Id. The dissent also emphasized
that recent congressional amendments to the section 10(b) action, enacted in the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 and in section 27A, see supra notes
99-102 and accompanying text, further indicated Congress' conscious choice not to provide
a right of contribution. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2095.
206. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2095.
207. Id.
208. Id.; see supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the purchaser-seller re-
quirement to have standing to bring a section 10(b) cause of action).
209. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2096.
210. Id.
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afford a right of contribution.21'
IV. SEEDING THE FOREST?
Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance is fitting irony.212
Although the Supreme Court refused to create an implied right of action
in at least eleven of the last fifteen cases before it,213 the Court neverthe-
less found it necessary to round out the contours of those implied rights
of action that it created previously.214 In Musick, Peeler, the Court per-
formed this unwelcome task, but in doing so, modified significant aspects
of its traditional implied rights jurisprudence.21 5
A. Contribution: A Cause of Action or a Remedy
In Musick, Peeler, the Court faced a dilemma-either act "most un-
fairly," by disavowing any authority to allocate damages among persons
who jointly commit section 10(b) violations, or disregard its professed
211. Id.
212. Despite the six member majority in Musick, Peeler, the current Court's dislike of
its implied rights jurisprudence is well documented. 3B BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14,
§ 9:03, at 9-30 (discussing the Court's attitude toward implied rights of action). The sum-
mons for the death knell of the implied rights doctrine became notably apparent in 1979
with Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Jus-
tice Powell argued that the doctrine articulated in Cort should be abandoned because it
allowed federal courts to assume policy-making authority vested in the legislative branch.
Id. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor also expressed
disdain for the implied rights doctrine. See supra note 99 (quoting Justice Scalia's concur-
rence in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988), in which Justice O'Connor joined).
Likewise, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, dissenting in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, stated that "the Court has undertaken a lawmaking task
that should properly be performed by Congress." 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2783 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), superseded by statute as stated in G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 783 F. Supp.
1532 (D.N.H. 1992). As a matter of fact, Justice Kennedy referred to the Court's approach
in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991), as "a sort of guerrilla
warfare to restrict a well-established implied right of action." Id. at 2770 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213. See supra note 71 (setting out those decisions in which the Court refused to recog-
nize an implied right of action).
214. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's willingness to
round out the contours of recognized implied rights of action).
215. Commentators predicted that the Court would be forced to re-examine its implied
rights jurisdiction due to the unduly narrow approach the Court adopted in Transamerica
Mortgage. See Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 553, 564
(1981) (discussing how unduly narrow the Supreme Court's implied rights jurisprudence
became after Transamerica); Schneider, supra note 11, at 900 (predicting that the Court
could not continue to limit its authority in providing implied rights of action merely be-
cause the right of action is implied by the courts); see also Joseph M. Hassett, Contribution
in Rule lob-5 Cases: Musick, Peeler and Beyond, Insights (P-H), Sept. 1993, at 22 (discuss-
ing the Court's need to govern the multitude of implied rights readily created under
Borak).
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hostility to implied rights by creating a new right of contribution. 216 In-
stead of choosing one of these unappealing options, the Court engaged in
legerdemain, characterizing contribution as a remedy, thereby finding the
Court's restrictive rules inapplicable.217 The dissent correctly noted that
contribution is not a remedy but a separate cause of action.218 In fact, as
the dissent noted, as recently as 1992, the Court treated contribution as a
cause of action, not a remedy. 219 The federal courts of appeals and dis-
trict courts likewise interpreted Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries
as defining contribution as a separate cause of action.220 However, to be
"fair" and "consistent" with its implied rights jurisprudence, the Court in
Musick, Peeler transformed contribution into a remedy.22'
Whether a right of contribution is merely a remedy or an entirely new
cause of action is significant in determining the outcome of a case. Crea-
tion of a new cause of action requires an analysis of such a right under the
stringent Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries framework, which, fol-
lowing Transamerica Mortgage, mandates a finding of clear congressional
intent.222 Consequently, application of the modified-Cort analysis would
216. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993); see supra
note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's view that it would be unfair to
disavow its authority to recognize an implied right of contribution under section 10(b)).
217. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2088 (stating that "the question before us is the ancil-
lary one of how damages are to be shared among persons or entities already subject to that
liability"); see supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's new
approach to its implied rights jurisprudence).
218. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2093; see supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text
(discussing the dissent's analysis of contribution as a separate cause of action). The dissent
reasoned that the creation of a right of contribution involves more than rounding out; it
extends the power of the federal courts to resolve disputes involving claims and parties that
otherwise would not be in federal court. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2093-94 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
219. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1034-35 n.6 (1992)
(distinguishing the standard for implying rights of actions, including contribution, from the
standard for implying remedies once a right of action has been established); see also supra
note 52 (discussing differences between rights and remedies); cf supra note 108 and ac-
companying text.
220. See Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 577 (9th Cir. 1992)
(finding that a right to contribution is a substantive duty and that such claims may be
brought in a separate cause of action), affd on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993); King
v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1280 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989) (disavowing an earlier decision that
treated the right to contribution as ancillary to the section 10(b) cause of action in light of
Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries); see also supra notes 107-09 and accompanying
text (discussing the implied right of contribution as a separate and independent cause of
action).
221. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2088, 2090; see supra notes 164-67 and accompanying
text (discussing the majority's view that contribution is ancillary to an underlying implied
cause of action).
222. See supra part II.A (discussing the Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries analyti-
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most likely result in dismissal of any implied contribution claim because
the tortfeasor was not a member of the class of intended beneficiaries of
the statute.223 The Musick, Peeler Court avoided strict application of the
modified-Cort analysis by determining that contribution is a remedy, not
a cause of action.224
By making such a determination, the Musick, Peeler Court reached a
result that appears to be squarely at odds with its previous implied rights
of contribution jurisprudence. The Court did not, however, necessarily
have to disregard its precedent. Express congressional acknowledgement
of the judiciary's authority to fashion the scope of the section 10(b) cause
of action could have served as the basis for the Court's decision. 225 The
Court simply could have construed this congressional abdication in defin-
ing the scope of section 10(b) as giving it a unique right to fashion a con-
tribution remedy under section 10(b)-a right extended to no other
statutory scheme.226
Alternatively, the Court could have honestly expressed its dislike for
implying new rights, but recognized the lower courts' longstanding prac-
tice of allowing the right of contribution under section 10(b).2 27 This also
would have limited the Musick, Peeler decision to section 10(b) causes of
action.228 Such an analysis would have helped to ensure that subsequent
cal framework); supra notes 59-70 (discussing the modification of the Cort four-part
analysis).
223. See Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Maryland, 939 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.
1991) (finding that once a court applies this analysis, it is impossible to find an implied
right of contribution), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3014 (1992); see also Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 n.31 (1981) (finding that the Cort inquiry may
end where "neither the statute nor the legislative history reveals a congressional intent to
create a private right of action for the benefit of the plaintiff"); King, 876 F.2d at 1281
(finding it unnecessary to continue the Cort analysis where examination of statutory lan-
guage and legislative history does not reveal congressional intent to provide a cause of
action for the benefit of those parties for whom the statute was enacted).
224. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1035 (1992) (finding
that the analysis for creating a cause of action is analytically distinct from that used for
fashioning a remedy); see also supra note 52.
225. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussing congressional abdica-
tion of the definition and maintenance of the section 10(b) cause of action).
226. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary's limited au-
thority to create federal common law).
227. See supra notes 34 and 106 (setting forth federal courts of appeal and district
courts decisions recognizing an implied right of contribution under section 10(b)). The
Court previously adopted the longstanding practice of the lower federal courts as a basis
for its decisions. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733
(1975) (adopting the longstanding practice of courts to establish the purchaser-seller re-
quirement); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) (acknowledging the implied right of action under section 10(b) long recognized by
the lower federal courts).
228. The Musick, Peeler Court's standard for determining what duties are ancillary to
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lower court interpretations of Musick, Peeler would not result in courts
creating new rights of action under the guise of creating remedies.229
By defining contribution as a remedy, the Musick, Peeler Court expo-
nentially increased the authority of federal courts.23° The Supreme Court
previously acknowledged that the federal judiciary has greater authority
to fashion remedies to enforce an existing implied right of action than to
create the underlying claim.23 1 This authority allows the judiciary to
award any appropriate remedy in any implied cause of action brought
pursuant to a federal statute. 232 The Supreme Court reiterated, however,
that a different standard exists for implying rights of actions.233
In Musick, Peeler, the Supreme Court blurred a rather clear distinction
between causes of actions and remedies.234 This judicial seed can now be
cultivated by lower federal courts, resulting in an expansion of implied
rights as long as they are denominated as remedies rather than causes of
an implied cause of action left unclear whether these duties are limited to the right of
contribution. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993);
see also supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's view that
contribution is ancillary to an underlying implied cause of action).
229. What is likely to happen may be illustrated by King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275 (7th
Cir. 1989). In King, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found no
implied right to indemnification under section 10(b). Id. at 1283. The court's analysis
turned on whether indemnification was a right or a remedy. Id. at 1279-80. The Seventh
Circuit disavowed an earlier case that characterized the right of contribution as ancillary to
the existing cause of action. Id. at 1280. Having concluded that indemnification, like con-
tribution, implicated substantive rights, the court found that a right to indemnification is a
cause of action. Id. The Seventh Circuit, therefore, applied the Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries analytical framework and found that no implied right to indemnification
existed under section 10(b). Id. at 1282.
230. The result is that an action for contribution against violators of section 10(b) effec-
tively becomes an action within the underlying action. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, Rule
JOb-5--Contribution, Set-Off, and Contribution Bars, 15 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark
Boardman) 81, 87 (Nov.-Dec. 1993). For example, once a right of contribution is recog-
nized, the courts would have to determine when the statute of limitations would begin to
toll, how long the statute of limitations is, whether the third-party defendants violated sec-
tion 10(b), and how to apportion liability among the joint tortfeasors. Id.
231. Creating the underlying action grants a court jurisdiction in cases in which it other-
wise would not have jurisdiction. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct.
1028, 1037 (1992); see also supra note 52.
232. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1037.
233. Id. at 1034.
234. Justice Cardozo, in Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936), cautioned:
If we follow the ascent far enough, countless claims of right can be discovered to
have their source or their operative limits in the provisions of a federal statute or
in the Constitution itself with its circumambient restrictions upon legislative
power. To set bounds to the pursuit, the courts have formulated the distinction
between controversies that are basic and those that are collateral, between dis-
putes that are necessary and those that are merely possible. We shall be lost in a
maze if we put that compass by.
Id. at 118.
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action.235 While the Supreme Court may quickly limit Musick, Peeler to
its facts in a future decision, the ensuing confusion may prove costly to
litigants and force lower courts to deal with unnecessary litigation.236
B. Distinguishing Between Express and Implied Rights of Action
On a broader level, Musick, Peeler sets forth a new framework that
allows federal courts to treat implied causes of action analytically differ-
ent from express causes of action.237 Prior to Musick, Peeler, the Court
rejected distinctions in analysis between express and implied causes of
action.238 Under Musick, Peeler, when presented with a request to create
235. A similar situation arose from the Court's 1964 Borak decision, resulting in the
"hey-day" of the Supreme Court's implied right doctrine. See Langmore & Prentice, supra
note 15, at 1035; supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the
Borak standard); see also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (holding that "it
is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make
effective the congressional purpose").
236. Schneider, supra note 11, at 901-02 (discussing the consequences ensuing from
confusing remedies and implied rights of action). The Supreme Court sought to clarify its
standard for determining primary and ancillary issues in seciton 10(b) causes of action in
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). In Central Bank, the Court
held that section 10(b) prohibits only primary violations where a defendant engages in
manipulative practices or makes material misstatements and does not create ancillary lia-
bility for those who merely aid or abet such practices. Id. at 1455. Consequently, the
distinction between primary liability for aiding and abetting and ancillary liability has be-
come important, whereas little distinction was made before.
The impact the Central Bank decision will have on implied rights of action may be far
reaching. The dissent in Central Bank noted that if no liability for aiding and abetting can
arise under a section 10(b) violation, then logically neither can any other form of secon-
dary liability result under section 10(b), including conspiracy, respondeat superior, and
other common-law agency theories of liability. Id. at 1460 & n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text. One commentator suggests that
what the Supreme Court is doing is three-fold. Joseph M. Hassett, Aiding and Abetting
Liability for 10b-5 Violations, 26 Sec. & Comm. Reg. (McGraw-Hill) 152, 155 (Sept. 15,
1993). First, the Court will not imply a new private cause of action outside sections 10(b)
and 14(a) of the 1934 Act absent a showing of congressional intent. Id. Second, the Court
will define the contours of an existing or accepted implied cause of action by examining
policy reasons, with or without a showing of congressional intent. Id. Finally, the Court
will define the contours of the section 10(b) implied cause of action by purporting to deter-
mine what the 1934 Congress would have done, while surreptitiously considering policy
implications. Id. This commentator suggests that the Court seeks to perform these func-
tions with respect to securities laws. Id. It appears, however, that the Court may have
adopted this approach in more general circumstances. See infra note 247 (comparing two
Supreme Court decisions considering express and implied rights of action under Title IX
and under ERISA).
238. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (re-
jecting the argument that a different analysis should be used to determine remedies for
implied causes of action than for express causes of action); cf Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2763-64 (1991) (recognizing that "where a legal structure of
private statutory rights has developed without clear indications of congressional intent, the
contours of that structure need not be frozen absolutely").
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an implied cause of action, federal courts must continue to apply the strict
analytical framework set forth in Texas Industries and Northwest Air-
lines.23 9 Conversely, when contribution for an implied cause of action is
sought, Musick, Peeler allows federal courts to treat the question as ancil-
lary to the underlying implied cause of action, thereby giving courts
broad discretion in determining whether to create a right of
contribution.240
However, the dissent's warning must be heeded.241  The majority's
analysis provides federal courts with immense power to develop so-called
remedies and procedural aspects of the implied causes of action recog-
nized thus far by the Supreme Court.242 The Court exercised this power
in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank243 to promulgate which matters of
a section 10(b) cause of action are primary and which are ancillary.
24"
The Court explained that its section 10(b) cases can be divided into those
that have determined the scope of conduct prohibited by section 10(b)
and those that have concerned the elements of the 10(b) private liability
scheme. 245 Given the Court's willingness to construe and develop ex-
239. See supra notes 159-69 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's decision
to distinguish between express and implied causes of action).
240. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's decision
to treat a right of contribution as ancillary to an underlying implied right of action).
241. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text (discussing the Musick, Peeler dis-
sent's argument that congressional silence is not a license for judicial action).
242. Since Borak, the Supreme Court created implied causes of action under a number
of statutes. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
356 (1982) (finding an implied right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1-26); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (finding an
implied right of action under section 901 of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1758); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-
60 (1975) (finding an implied right of action under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Acts, 42
U.S.C. § 1981); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969) (finding an implied
right of action under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c); J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (finding an implied right of action under sec-
tion 14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n); see supra note 71 (listing Supreme Court deci-
sions creating implied causes of action since Transamerica Mortgage); see also Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1032 (1992) (finding that the implied right of
action under section 901 of Title IX supports an implied right to damages).
243. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
244. Id. at 1145-46.
245. Id. In reshaping the scope and elements of the section 10(b) cause of action, the
Court overruled numerous lower court decisions that had recognized the section 10(b)
aiding and abetting cause of action. Id. The Central Bank Court discerned from the statu-
tory text of section 10(b) that no aiding and abetting liability existed. Id. at 1448. This
decision demonstrates the extent to which the Court is willing to alter the rights and reme-
dies available to the beneficiaries of the 1934 Act, as well as its willingness to narrowly
construe the scope of implied liability under section 10(b). See supra note 236 (discussing
the implications of the Central Bank decision).
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isting implied rights of actions, 24 6 it is likely that federal courts will use
their new power to fashion contribution remedies and other rights that
Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries would have prevented them from
fashioning if these statutes contained an express cause of action.247
C. The 1934 Congress and the Contribution Issue
In Musick, Peeler, the Court sought to discern whether the 1934 Con-
gress would have allowed contribution under section 10(b) if it had con-
sidered the issue.248 Unfortunately, the Court merely engaged in strict
statutory construction, limiting its inquiry to reviewing other sections of
the 1934 and 1933 Acts.249 It recognized two similar sections authorizing
contribution and attempted to distinguish those sections lacking such au-
thorization.25 ° The Court then concluded that section 10(b) more closely
resembled those sections containing contribution rights, and relied upon
this resemblance to permit contribution.25'
This conclusion is suspect because the Court wholly failed to consider
what the 1934 Congress would have done in light of the general state of
the law of contribution in 1934. The 1992 Supreme Court decision Frank-
lin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,252 conversely, used a more com-
prehensive analysis in deciding whether to provide an implied remedy to
an underlying implied cause of action under Title IX.253 In Franklin, the
Court evaluated the general state of the law before and after Title IX was
246. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 (1991) (stating that
the Court has limited power to round out implied causes of action); see also supra notes 72-
74 and accompanying text.
247. Compare Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1034-35 (1992)
(finding an implied right to monetary damages from an implied right of action under Title
IX) with Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993) (finding no implied right to
monetary damages from an express right of action under ERISA).
248. See supra text accompanying note 173 (discussing the majority's standard).
249. See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's compari-
son of section 10(b) to sections 9 and 18).
250. See supra notes 175-82.
251. See supra notes 175-82. The Court failed to examine the legislative histories of
these provisions. If it had done so, the Court would have discovered that sections 9 and 10
were treated similarly in congressional debates when Congress was considering the enact-
ment of the 1934 Act. Thel, supra note 78, at 430. The Court also would have considered
that the 1934 Congress intended section 10(b) to serve as a "catch-all" provision. See supra
note 76 (discussing references to section 10(b) in the legislative history of the 1934 Act).
The Court, therefore, reasonably could have concluded that contribution should have been
provided in section 10(b) because sections 9 and 10(b) are so closely related.
252. 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1035 (1992).
253. Id. at 1035-36. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994), examined the state of aiding and abetting law before the 1934
Act was promulgated to find that the 1934 Congress would not have attached aiding and
abetting liability to section 10(b). Id. at 1451-52.
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enacted, and after the underlying implied cause of action was created, to
determine what the enacting Congress would have done.254
A similar analysis should have been made in Musick, Peeler to deter-
mine whether the 1934 Congress would have provided a right of contribu-
tion under section 10(b). If the Court had done so, it is less likely that it
would have been able to create such a right without considering policy
issues, since a right to contribution was not generally recognized under
the common law in 1934.255 At that time, the rule in all but four common
law jurisdictions was that there was no right to contribution between joint
tortfeasors.256 Thus, the 1934 Congress understood that a right of contri-
bution did not exist unless explicitly provided for within a statute. An
historical review rarely reveals that the omission of a particular remedy
was merely an oversight, or that Congress believed that the courts would
recognize an implied remedy thereby making it unnecessary for Congress
to expressly create such a remedy.257 If Congress intended to provide a
right of contribution under section 10(b), it could have expressly recog-
nized one, as it did in sections 9 and 18.258
254. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035-36. The Franklin Court determined that Congress was
fully aware that the Court recognized an implied right of action under Title IX. Id. at 1036.
The Court further determined that two congressional amendments to Title IX validated its
earlier decision to provide an implied right of action. Id. Similarly, the Musick, Peeler
Court acknowledged congressional validation of its authority to define the scope of the
section 10(b) implied cause of action. See supra notes 169 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the majority's acknowledgement of its authority to define the scope of the section 10(b)
cause of action).
255. Until this century, contribution among tortfeasors was not recognized under Eng-
lish or American common law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. a
(1979). During the twentieth century, however, many American jurisdictions rejected the
common law rule either by statute or by judicial decision. As a result, approximately 40
jurisdictions now allow for contribution among tortfeasors. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 86-87, nn.16-17 (1981) and RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. a (1979), for a thorough discussion of the trend in American
courts and state legislatures to recognize a right to contribution.
256. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 87 n.17; see also Francis H. Bohlen, Contribu-
tion and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552 (1936). The four jurisdic-
tions adopting a judicially created right to contribution before the enactment of the 1934
Act were: Louisiana, Quatray v. Wicker, 151 So. 208 (La. 1933); Pennsylvania, Goldman v.
Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 141 A. 231 (Pa. 1928); Minnesota, Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith,
208 N.W. 13 (Minn. 1926); and Wisconsin, Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 167 N.W. 1048
(Wis. 1918).
257. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 51; see also Langmore & Prentice, supra note 15, at
1041 (explaining that, in light of the legal landscape in 1933, the omission of the right of
contribution in a statutory scheme was the norm, while the inclusion was an "aberration");
Thel, supra note 78, at 385, 431 (arguing that Congress in fact intended the SEC to regulate
section 10(b), thereby distinguishing it from other sections of the 1934 Act).
258. Support for this notion is found in the Court's Transamerica Mortgage and Touche
Ross decisions, which held that when a court seeks to discern congressional intent through
an examination of other provisions within an act, it would be improbable that Congress
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Finally, the Musick, Peeler Court disingenuously ignored serious policy
questions underlying its recognition of a contribution right, and even con-
tradicted its own analysis on this point.259 The Court found that it pos-
sessed the authority to treat contribution as an ancillary question to the
section 10(b) implied right of action because it would be "unfair" to
tortfeasors sued under section 10(b) for the Court to refuse to allow them
to obtain contribution from joint tortfeasors. 26 ° But deciding what is fair
is a policy decision.26' The Court expressly refused to consider other
equally relevant policy questions, such as equity and efficiency, in deter-
mining whether to create an implied right to contribution.262 The Court
returned to policy questions at the conclusion of its opinion, however,
stressing that its holding will stand only so long as the right of contribu-
tion does not adversely affect the efficiency of the section 10(b) action.263
was "absentminded" in not including such right in the provision in question when other
provisions expressly provided for such a right. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying
text; see also Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 n.11 (1981) (finding
"[tihat Congress knows how to define a right to contribution is shown by the express ac-
tions for contribution" under various sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts).
259. In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991), the Supreme
Court expressly stated that if faced with a claim to round out the scope of an implied right
of action, it will consider policy reasons to determine the outer limits of that right. Id. at
2764. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court in Musick, Peeler faulted the parties for devoting
considerable portions of their briefs to discussing the policy considerations of contribution.
Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2089 (1993).
260. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2088; see supra note 168 and accompanying text.
261. In Texas Industries, the Supreme Court explained that it was unable to imply a
right of contribution because the policy questions presented required a "range of factors to
be weighed," which is "a matter for Congress, not the courts, to resolve." Texas Industries,
451 U.S. at 646. The Court concluded that "[a]scertaining what is 'fair' in this setting calls
for inquiry into the entire spectrum of [an area of] law, not simply the elements of a partic-
ular case or category of cases." Id. at 646-47 (emphasis added).
262. Musick, Peeler, 113 S. Ct. at 2089; see supra note 172 and accompanying text. But
see supra note 259 (discussing the Supreme Court's consideration of policy issues in defin-
ing the contours of an implied right of action).
263. See supra note 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's decision
that its rule of contribution is an effective remedy). The tension prevalent in Musick,
Peeler-whether the Court should consider policy issues-brings to bear the same con-
cerns the Court faces in creating federal common law. See Steven D. Smith, Courts, Crea-
tivity, and the Duty to Decide a Case, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 573, 575-76; see also supra notes
3-7 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary's authority to create federal common
law). By deciding policy issues and identifying them as such, the Court confronts its law-
making function. See supra note 4 (discussing separation of powers concerns). Histori-
cally, when the Supreme Court confronted such policy issues, as in Texas Industries and
Northwest Airlines, it rejected the judiciary's role in deciding policy as well as narrowly
construing its authority to create federal common law. See Smith, supra, at 613-14; see also
supra note 261 (discussing the Court's rejection of a policy making function). But the
Musick, Peeler Court avoids such a direct confrontation, while still considering policy is-
sues. See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text. Consequently, Musick, Peeler may
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insur-
ance finally acknowledged the existence of an implied right to contribu-
tion under section 10(b). The Court correctly undertook this
jurisprudence to be fair to tortfeasors. It did so, however, at the cost of
rendering its strict implied rights jurisprudence inapplicable where reme-
dies are concerned. The blurring of the distinction between rights and
remedies risks giving the judiciary broad authority to transform substan-
tive rights into remedies when seeking to provide relief through an im-
plied cause of action. Paradoxically, Musick, Peeler seems to give the
judiciary virtually unlimited power to impose contribution for violations
of statutes in which Congress failed to create an express cause of action,
but little if any power to imply contribution for a cause of action that
Congress expressly created.
Francine J. Rosenberger
be a signal that the Court's restrictive view of the judiciary's function in creating federal
common law is shifting.
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